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IDEAS, INTERESTS, INSTITUTIONS AND  
THE HISTORY OF CANADIAN BANKRUPTCY LAW 1867-1880 
Thomas G.W. Telfer* 
 
I. Introduction 
Professor Michael Trebilcock’s scholarship has long recognized the importance of 
history. For example, in The Law and Economics of Canadian Competition Policy1 
Professor Trebilcock and his co-authors seek to explain “why antitrust law was a 
relatively late arrival…and why it arrived first in North America.”2 The authors conclude 
that competition policy has always been a matter of politics that involves both 
“influential and often divergent economic interests and contested values or ideologies.” 
The authors emphasized that institutions mediate the economic interests and the 
competing ideas.3 
Michael Trebilcock and Ninette Kelley also make economic interests, contested 
ideas, and institutions the focus of The Making of the Mosaic: A History of Canadian 
Immigration Policy.4 Trebilcock and Kelley recognize the interrelationship between 
ideas, interests and institutions. For example, the terms of public discourse may actually 
“disguise the true interests at play.” Trebilcock and Kelley conclude that it will be: 
strategic for an interest group to disguise its self interest under the rubric of a 
broader normative idea in order to engage the other members of the political 
community who may share the idea but not the interest.5 
 
                                                 
* Cassels Brock LLP Faculty Fellow 2009-2010, The University of Western Ontario. This paper is part of a 
larger study of Canadian Bankruptcy Law 1867-1919. 
 
1 Michael Trebilcock et. al., The Law and Economics of Canadian Competition Policy (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2003) [hereafter “Canadian Competition Policy”]. 
 
2 Ibid. at 12. See also Michael Trebilcock et. al., The Political Economy of Business Bailouts, vol. 1 
(Toronto: Ontario Economic Council, 1985); Michael J. Trebilcock & Robert Howse, The Regulation of 
International Trade, 2d ed. (London: Routledge, 1999). 
 
3 Canadian Competition Policy at 12. 
 
4 Michael Trebilcock & Ninette Kelley, The Making of the Mosaic: A History of Canadian Immigration 
Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998) [hereafter “Making of the Mosaic”]. 
 
5 Ibid. at 9. 
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To understand the interaction of ideas and interests in the development of a particular 
public policy “requires a careful interpretation of the rhetoric of public discourse.”6 
Interest groups are central to public choice theory7 that conceives of the political process 
as: 
an implicit ‘market’ where the relevant actors – voters and special interest groups 
(demanders), politicians, bureaucrats, regulators (suppliers), and the media 
(intermediaries) – tend to be motivated by material self interest.8 
 
Under this theory, public policy decision makers seek to maximize political support 
rather than opting for a course of action that would advance the broader public interest.9 
Finally, institutions “exert an independent influence on what interests and ideas in 
particular policy domains are given effect to or marginalized” in policy decisions.10 
Therefore, ideas and interests must be mediated through institutions “in order to be 
translated into public policy.”11 Like Trebilcock and Kelley’s study of Canadian 
immigration policy, it is my hope to discover from “the Canadian historical experience, 
an understanding of the ideas, interests, and institutions that have been influential over 
time in shaping the evolution”12 of Canadian bankruptcy policy. 
 
II. Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law: 1867-1880 
A. BANKRUPTCY IDEAS, INTERESTS AND INSTITUTIONS: AN OVERVIEW 
After Confederation, Parliament passed bankruptcy legislation in 186913 and 
again in 1875.14 However, calls for repeal began shortly after the federal Insolvent Act of 
                                                 
6 Ibid. at 11. 
 
7 See Denis Meuller, Public Choice III (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 1. 
 
8 Making of the Mosaic at 9. 
 
9 Ibid. at 9; Canadian Competition Policy at 16; Denis Meuller, Public Choice III (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003) at 1. 
 
10 Making of the Mosaic at 11. 
 
11 Ibid. at 10. 
 
12 Ibid. at 12. 
 
13 Insolvent Act of 1869, S.C. 1869, c. 16. 
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1869 came into force and extended through to 1880. In that year, Parliament repealed the 
Insolvent Act of 1875 and did not enact another general bankruptcy law until 1919.15 This 
paper seeks to explain why Parliament abandoned its jurisdiction over bankruptcy and 
insolvency law shortly after Confederation. The question is analysed through the lens of 
ideas, interests, and institutions.  
The bankruptcy law’s two fundamental principles, the discharge and the equitable 
distribution of the debtor’s assets, provided the framework for the debates. The debate 
over the discharge was not a purely disinterested competition of ideas. Although the 
principles of a moral obligation to repay and the release of the debtor from the burden of 
debt featured prominently in the debates, one economic interest tapped into the rhetoric 
of moral obligation to advance the cause for repeal. The Insolvent Acts excluded farmers, 
making them ineligible for a discharge.16 Invoking the higher obligation to pay, the 
farming community through their MPs sought repeal in order to place farmers on an 
equal footing with commercial interests. Bankruptcy law’s distribution of assets provided 
another focal point in the debates. Bankruptcy law destroyed local advantage as it 
abolished the common law race to the debtor’s assets and prohibited the payment of 
preferential claims to local or friendly creditors. Urban-based Boards of Trade and 
Dominion Board of Trade (DBT) and the commercial interests they represented had the 
most to lose if Parliament repealed the legislation. Boards of Trade lobbied for the 
retention of the law but their efforts failed as they ultimately remained divided on the 
repeal issue. 
Institutions also had an autonomous influence on policy choice.17 Public policies 
are directly related to “historically changing institutional arrangements” of the state, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
14 Insolvent Act of 1875, S.C. 1875, c. 16. 
 
15 S.C. 1880, c. 1; Bankruptcy Act of 1919, S.C. 1919, c. 36. 
 
16 J.D. Edgar, The Insolvent Act of 1869 (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1869) at 33-34. 
 
17 Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative 
Capacities, 1877-1920 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1982) at ix. 
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political parties.18 In the words of Douglass North, “History matters… because the 
present and future are connected to the past by the continuity of a society's institutions.”19 
The study of institutions has generated a large body of literature by “new 
institutionalists.”20 This paper examines institutions such as the relative strength or 
weakness of the state,21 political parties, bankruptcy administration, the courts,22 and 
federalism.23 The weakness of the state and divided political parties inhibited the 
implementation of stable and lasting bankruptcy legislation. The incompetency of 
Official Assignees, who administered the bankrupt’s estate, became a central point for 
those supporting repeal. The Ontario county courts also contributed to the unpopularity of 
the legislation by interpreting it in a way that favoured debtors. Finally, federalism had an 
independent effect on policy direction.24 At the end of the 1870s, Ontario’s proposal of a 
provincial law that distributed the debtor’s assets on a pro rata basis without the 
controversial discharge provided Parliament with an opportunity to repeal the unpopular 
federal bankruptcy law. 
 
                                                 
18 Theda Skocpol, “Reply: Against Evolutionism – Social Policies and American Political Development” 
(1994) 8 Stud. Amer. Pol. Dev. 140 at 142. 
 
19 Douglass North, “Economic Performance Through Time” The Prize Lecture in Economic Science in 
memory of Alfred Nobel (The Nobel Foundation: Mimeo, 1993) at vii. 
 
20 See e.g., André Lecours, ed., New Institutionalism: Theory and Analysis (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2005). On the debate over what is an institution see e.g., Philip Ethington & Eileen McDonagh, “The 
Eclectic Center of the New Institutionalism: Axes of Analysis in Comparative Perspective” (1995) 19 Soc. 
Sci. Hist. 467-477. 
 
21 R. Kent Weaver & Bert A. Rockman, “Assessing the Effects of Institutions” in R. Kent Weaver & Bert 
A. Rockman, eds., Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad 
(Washington: Brookings Institution, 1993) at 32. 
 
22 Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative 
Capacities, 1877-1920 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1982) at 27. 
 
23 André Lecours, “New Institutionalism: Issues and Questions” in André Lecours, ed., New 
Institutionalism: Theory and Analysis (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005) at 6. 
 
24 R. Kent Weaver & Bert A. Rockman, “Assessing the Effects of Institutions” in R. Kent Weaver & Bert 
A. Rockman, eds. Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad 
(Washington: Brookings Institution, 1993) at 31; David Brian Robertson, “History, Behaviouralism, and 
the Return to Institutionalism in American Political Science” in E.H. Monkkonen, ed., Engaging the Past: 
The Uses of History Across the Social Sciences (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994) at 137. 
 
 6
B. CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 
The Constitution Act, 1867 established “bankruptcy and insolvency” as an 
exclusive power of Parliament.25 The Insolvent Act of 186926 permitted involuntary 
proceedings, commenced by creditors, and voluntary proceedings, initiated by debtors. 
To obtain a discharge and a release of their debts debtors required creditor consent and 
subsequent court approval.27 The legislation also permitted the court to issue a second-
class discharge. Both a first- and second-class discharge released a bankrupt from his or 
her debts. However, the court awarded first-class discharges where the bankruptcy had 
arisen from unavoidable misfortune.28 A court could order a second-class discharge 
where, for example, the insolvent had been guilty of misconduct or incurred debts 
without a reasonable expectation of payment.29 The Act only applied to traders.30 Only 
those engaging in buying and selling were within the scope of the Act and eligible for the 
discharge while farmers or professionals could not make a filing under the Act and obtain 
a discharge. 
The Insolvent Act of 1875 sought to address some of the defects in the 1869 Act. 
While there was some similarity between the two statutes, (e.g. they both applied to 
traders)31 there was a consensus that the Act of 1869 had not gone far enough to protect 
creditors.32 The Insolvent Act of 1875 abolished voluntary proceedings.33 The 1875 Act 
                                                 
25 Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 91(21), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5. 
Although Parliament labelled the nineteenth century legislation as the Insolvent Acts, they operated as 
bankruptcy legislation. Re Hurst, an Insolvent (1876), 6 P.R. 329 (Ont. Pr. Ct.); McWhirter v. Thorne 
(1869), 19 U.C.C.P. 302. 
 
26 Insolvent Act of 1869, S.C. 1869, c. 36, s. 155. The original Act was a temporary 4-year measure. 
Parliament extended the Act twice: S.C. 1873, c. 2; S.C. 1874, c. 46. 
 
27 Insolvent Act of 1869, ss. 94, 98, 101. 
 
28 See J. Popham, The Insolvent Act of 1869 (Montreal, Dawson Bros, 1869) at 138. 
 
29 Insolvent Act of 1869, s. 103. On the English experience, see Barbara Weiss, The Hell of the English: 
Bankruptcy and the Victorian Novel (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1986) at 45. 
 
30 See e.g., Thomas v. Hall (1874), 6 P.R. 172 (Ont. P.C.). 
 
31 See e.g., Creighton v. Chittick (1881), 7 S.C.R. 348. 
 
32 C. Beausoleil, La Loi de Faillite (Montreal: Plinguet, 1877) 2. 
 
33 Ivan Wotherspoon & C.H. Stephens, The Insolvent Act of 1875 (Montreal: Dawson Brothers, 1875) at vi. 
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retained the class-based discharge regime but made the discharge more difficult to obtain 
by requiring that the debtor’s assets meet a threshold of 33 cents on the dollar.34 When 
the Conservatives returned to power in 1878, they were uncertain how to proceed and in 
1879 established a Committee to study bankruptcy law.35 The Committee produced Bill 
85 that would have made discharge nearly impossible. The Bill required a debtor to 
obtain the consent of creditors representing 4/5 in number and 4/5 in value.36 The Bill 
never became law, with Parliament eventually opting to repeal the Insolvent Act of 1875 
in 1880.37 
 
C. THE DISCHARGE 
The Canadian bankruptcy debates took place during an international financial 
panic that began in 1873. Five years of falling prices and financial failure followed.38 
This economic crisis created an intense debate as political actors and interest groups 
sought to “provide compelling and convincing diagnoses” for the federal bankruptcy 
reform question.39 The discharge was the most contentious aspect of the bankruptcy law 
debates with notions of forgiveness competing unsuccessfully with the idea that all debts 
had to be honoured. Sir John A. Macdonald claimed “when a man made a clean breast of 
his affairs, and gave his estate honestly for the benefit of his creditors, he ought to have 
relief.”40 John Abbott, the drafter of the Insolvent Act of 1864 asked, “why should a man 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
34 Insolvent Act of 1875, s. 58. Parliament raised the threshold to 50 cents on the dollar in 1877. S.C. 1877, 
c. 41, s. 14, 15. 
 
35 James Bicknell, “Establishing a Bankruptcy Court in Canada” (1913) 33 Can. L.T. 43. 
 
36 Bill 85, An Act to Repeal the Insolvent Act of 1875, and the Acts Amending it, and to Make Provision for 
the Liquidation of the Estates of Insolvent Debtors, 1st Sess., 4th Parl., 1879, s. 44. 
 
37 S.C. c. 1, 1880. 
 
38 M. Bliss, Northern Enterprise: Five Centuries of Canadian Business (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 
1987) at 249; K. Norrie & D. Owram, A History of the Canadian Economy (Toronto: Harcourt, 1991) at 
293-298. 
 
39 See e.g., Colin Hay, “Ideas, Interests and Institutions in the Comparative Political Economy of Great 
Transformations” (2004) 11 Rev. Int’l Pol. Econ. 204 at 207. 
 
40 House of Commons Debates (11 May 1869) at 258. 
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who had been overwhelmed by a sudden depreciation in the value of produce…” be 
deprived of a discharge?41 A letter published in the Journal of Commerce argued that 
bankruptcy law should provide relief to the honest and unfortunate debtor “even though 
he be so through folly or bad judgment.”42 A discharge was a means to release debtors 
from their “shackles”43 or the “mill stone” of debt.44  
On the other hand, Alexander Mackenzie, the Leader of the Opposition, and 
future Prime Minister of Canada, argued that bankruptcy law “had been found eminently 
conducive to public immorality.”45 Bankruptcy law “was conceived in sin, and whose 
fruits had been iniquity from first to last.”46 A law that impaired the moral obligation to 
pay was “an unsound and impolitic law” and should not be enacted by any Parliament.47 
In a pamphlet entitled Fallacy of Insolvency Laws and their Baneful Effects, the author 
asserted that the state had no right to enact any law that would give increased opportunity 
for debtors to disregard “the duties and responsibilities of their condition in life.” 48 Court 
files also provide evidence of anti-debtor sentiment. One creditor reminded the debtor 
that he was going to “pay for all this yet…and you will have to suffer.”49 Another 
creditor charged that the “the penitentiary would be a very appropriate residence” for 
such a “worthless creature.”50 
                                                 
41 House of Commons Debates (11 May 1869) at 262 (Abbott). 
 
42 Letter to Editor of J. of Commerce (5 March 1877) in “Insolvency” J. of Commerce (8 March 1877) 116. 
 
43 Debates of the Senate (18 June 1869) at 357 (Sanborn). 
 
44 House of Commons Debates (2 May 1872) at 286 (Anglin). 
 
45 House of Commons Debates (11 May 1869) at 253. 
 
46 House of Commons Debates (7 March 1879) at 202 (Rymal). 
 
47 House of Commons Debates (20 March 1875) at 815 (Maclennan). 
 
48 Thomas Ritchie, The Fallacy of Insolvency Laws and their Baneful Effects (1885) at 18. 
 
49 Letter of Dickie & Kennedy, The Buckeye Spring Hoe Broadcast Seeder and Drill and Horse Rakes, to 
McMichael and Hughson, 4 June 1877; Re McMichael & Hughson (23 June 1877); Kent County Court 
Insolvency Files, 1874-1881, RG 22-2675 (AO). 
 
50 Letter of A. Watts, Importer, Brampton to H. Cumming, 18 August 1878; Re J. Taylor (19 April 1877); 
Kent County Court Insolvency Files, 1874-1881, RG 22-2675, (AO). 
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The negative public perception of bankruptcy and the notion that a debtor had a 
moral obligation to pay may have contributed to the number of debtors who absconded to 
avoid bankruptcy. Wentworth county records show that eight per cent of the files 
involved debtors51 who fled to the United States or another province rather than face the 
humiliation and stigma that bankruptcy would bring.52 With a relatively porous border, 
absconding debtors headed for destinations that included Milwaukee,53 New York City 
(with intention to sail to England),54 Lewiston, NY,55 and Detroit.56 While some debtors 
took family with them,57 others avoided the shame of having to confront their family with 
news of debt and default. One Hamilton lumber merchant left his family a letter stating 
“he was a ruined man and that he had left for good.”58 
While bankruptcy attracted negative public sentiment, it is important to ask 
whether any underlying interest relied on public discourse to their advantage. Trebilcock 
and Kelley remind us that the terms of public discourse may actually “disguise the true 
interests at play.”59 Further, public policy does not always respond to the “common 
good” but rather the aim for MPs is to construct “winning coalitions” even if the policy 
                                                 
51 Wentworth County Court Insolvency Files, 1864-1880, RG 22-5762 (AO). 
 
52 See e.g., Consolidated Bank of Canada v. William Harris (17 March 1879); Sarah Catherine Birley v. 
Lewis D. Birley (3 July 1879); Wentworth County Court Insolvency Files, 1864-1880, RG 22-5762 (AO). 
 
53 Joseph Chemer & Havier Chemer v. James Ball (19 April 1875); Wentworth County Court Insolvency 
Files, 1864-1880, RG 22-5762 (AO). 
 
54 Bank of British North America v. Robert Yates & David Garson (20 December 1875); Wentworth 
County Court Insolvency Files, 1864-1880, RG 22-5762 (AO). 
 
55 Cassandra Wisker v. James Barnes (23 May 1877); Wentworth County Court Insolvency Files, 1864-
1880, RG 22-5762 (AO). 
 
56 John Wood v. John Callaghan (8 May 1877); Wentworth County Court Insolvency Files, 1864-1880, RG 
22-5762 (AO). 
 
57 George Taylor & Francis Ninety v. Daniel Murphy (14 March 1873); Joseph Chemer & Havier Chemer 
v. James Ball (19 April 1875); Wentworth County Court Insolvency Files, 1864-1880, RG 22-5762 (AO). 
 
58 Bank of British North America v. Julius McCarty (23 March 1874); Wentworth County Court Insolvency 
Files, 1864-1880, RG 22-5762 (AO). 
 
59 Making of the Mosaic at 9. 
 
 10
has the effect of reducing social welfare.60 In the bankruptcy context, rural based MPs 
advanced arguments against the discharge. Farmers and rural areas represented a high 
proportion of the population in the 1870s.61 What specifically raised the ire of the rural 
community was the trader rule that excluded farmers from the Act. A farmer, who sold 
grain to a miller on credit, risked having his claim extinguished by the miller’s 
discharge.62 Further, if the miller’s bankruptcy led to the farmer’s ruin, the trader rule 
prohibited the farmer from obtaining a discharge.63 The rationale in support of the rule 
suggested that traders required a special law to guard against economic risk. Non-traders 
borrowed out of extravagance and not out of necessity.64  
Rural MPs did not accept this rationale. One MP, a representative of “the 
agricultural class,” argued that the farmers were also “subject to the uncertainties of life.” 
Storms could destroy crops, disease could “carry off flocks,” and lightning could destroy 
his buildings.65 During the 1870s, rural MPs repeatedly pointed out that “the majority of 
their constituents” including farmers did not receive any benefits from the Act but were 
“compelled to bear their share of the loss.”66 Rural opposition to bankruptcy law became 
an issue in the election of 1878 and rural constituencies urged the Government to repeal 
the legislation as they viewed it as “class legislation.”67  
                                                 
60 Canadian Competition Policy at 16. See Dennis Mueller, Public Choice III (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003) at 1. 
 
61 K. Norrie & D. Owram, A History of the Canadian Economy (Toronto: Harcourt, 1991) at 277. The 1871 
census reported 49% of respondents claimed farming as their occupation. See also Richard Pomfret, The 
Economic Development of Canada (Toronto: Methuen, 1981) at 53. 
 
62 J. Bicknell, “Establishing a Bankruptcy Court in Canada” (1913) 33 Can. L.T. 35 at 46. 
 
63 See House of Commons Debates (20 March 1875) at 810 (Mills); James Bicknell, “The Advisability of 
Establishing a Bankruptcy Court in Canada” (1913) 33 Can. L. Times 35. 
 
64 R.M.F., “Legislation upon Insolvency” (1873) 2 Can. Monthly 419 at 420. 
 
65 House of Commons Debates (7 March 1879) at 217 (Landry). 
 
66 J. Bicknell, “Establishing a Bankruptcy Court in Canada” (1913) 33 Can. L.T. 35 at 46. 
 
67 House of Commons Debates (7 March 1879) at 209-210 (McCallum). 
 
 11
However, in pointing out the unfairness of the trader rule, there was no call for a 
bankruptcy law of general application.68 Equality of treatment could best be achieved by 
repeal.69 The demand for repeal, however, continued to be expressed in traditional terms. 
Rural Canada could not tolerate a law which “allowed [a debtor] to avoid paying all his 
debts.” People were willing to “return to the good sound principle which bound every 
man to pay his legitimate debts.” 70 
 
D. THE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF THE DEBTOR’S ASSETS 
Bankruptcy law prohibited preferential payments that debtors often made to 
related parties or local creditors.71 The federal legislation also abolished the common law 
race to the debtor’s assets by providing for a pro rata distribution to all unsecured 
creditors.72 This had the effect of reducing risk for distant or foreign creditors, and 
destroyed local advantage. The common law rewarded priority of execution providing an 
advantage to local creditors.73 While a distant creditor may have commenced proceedings 
first, neighbours, fathers, or brothers might convince the debtor to consent to judgment 
“so that the neighbour or friend got the whole proceeds.”74 Those who feared the repeal 
of the Insolvent Act of 1875 claimed that distant creditors would be disadvantaged and 
“injury would be inflicted on the people of the distant provinces.”75 
When the House of Commons voted in favour of repeal in 1879 bankruptcy law 
supporters in the Senate mounted a campaign to prevent the law’s demise. One Senator 
tabled a petition noting that merchants in large cities including Montreal, Quebec, St. 
                                                 
68 House of Commons Debates (20 March 1875) at 821. 
 
69 House of Commons Debates (25 February 1880) at 222 (McCuaig). 
 
70 House of Commons Debates (7 March 1879) at 220 (Bechard). 
 
71 See e.g., McLeod v. Wright (1877), 17 N.B.R. 68 (S.C. (Eq. App.)). 
 
72 See e.g., Jones v. Kinney (1885), 11 S.C.R. 708 at para. 4. 
 
73 J.D. Edgar, The Insolvent Act of 1869 (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1869) at 128. 
 
74 House of Commons Debates (11 May 1869) at 259. 
 
75 House of Commons Debates (26 February 1877) at 304 (Workman); G. Beausoleil, La Loi De Faillite 
(Montreal: Plinguet, 1877) at 6. 
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John and Toronto had large transactions in other provinces. This made a general 
bankruptcy law essential “in order to make their transaction reasonably safe.” 76 Although 
the Senate blocked repeal in 1879, both Houses voted for repeal the next year. Why that 
occurred requires an examination of the role of interest groups and institutions. 
In the United States, the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 has been linked 
to the emergence of chambers of commerce and boards of trade.77 Canadian Boards of 
Trade as well as a national body, the DBT emerged as interest groups in the 1870s. From 
the outset, local Boards of Trade influenced the shape of the Insolvent Act of 1869,78 the 
Insolvent Act of 1875 and their various amendments.79 Local Boards of Trade also took 
an interest in the repeal question. For example, the Toronto Board of Trade told Prime 
Minister Macdonald that the Board was “unanimously of opinion” that repeal would be 
“most disastrous to business interests of the country.”80  
The DBT offered local Boards of Trade a national voice. The DBT clearly saw 
itself as a “Commercial Parliament” and sought to bring its “views to bear on the 
government” by ensuring that its resolutions came to the attention of the relevant 
Ministers.81 The DBT aimed to “secure unity and harmony of action” for commercial 
laws.82 However, on the issue of bankruptcy law there was no unity.83 In 1878, the DBT 
convened a Special Committee on bankruptcy. The Halifax, Ottawa and Levis Boards of 
                                                 
76 Debates of the Senate (8 May 1879) at 514 (Ryan). 
 
77 D. Skeel, Debt’s Dominion: A History of Bankruptcy Law in America (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2001) at 36, 39; B. Hansen, “Commercial Associations and the Creation of a National Economy: The 
Demand for Federal Bankruptcy Law” (1998) 72 Bus. Hist. Rev. 86. 
 
78 House of Commons, Select Committee, “Third Report of the Select Committee on Bankruptcy and 
Insolvency” in House of Commons Journals (17 April 1868) at 9. 
 
79 Dominion Board of Trade, Annual Report 1874 at 13 [hereafter DBT]; Petition of the Boards of Trade, of 
Banking Institutions, and of Merchants and Manufactures of Montreal, 30 April 1872; RG6-A-1; Vol. 11, 
File No. 704, Secretary of State Papers (PAC). 
 
80 J. Morrison, President Toronto Board of Trade, Telegram to Sir John A. Macdonald, 1 March 1880; 
Macdonald Papers, MG 26-A, Reel C-1748, pp. 169691 to 169665 (PAC). 
 
81 DBT, Annual Meeting 1874 at 27. 
 
82 DBT, Annual Meeting, 1872, Appendix. 
 
83 DBT, Annual Meeting 1872 at 75-77; DBT, Annual Meeting 1877 at 158. 
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Trade instructed their representatives on the Special Committee to vote for repeal.84 In 
1879, the DBT issued a comprehensive report recommending several amendments to the 
Act. Many members of the DBT spoke in favour of repeal. Members of the DBT defeated 
a motion supporting repeal of the Insolvent Act of 1875 by a 10-9 margin.85 The division 
within the commercial community combined with the strong opposition from the rural 
community contributed to the demise Canada’s bankruptcy regime. A national and united 




(i) The state and party systems 
The capacity of the political system can limit public policy developments. 
Political capacity includes the expertise of those passing the laws and individuals who 
administer the legislation. There was no separate bankruptcy office or department. 
Bankruptcy law was not part of a larger regulatory state.87 Those with a particular 
concern wrote directly to the Minister of Justice or to the Prime Minister.88 The various 
governments of the day showed little interest in the legislation and never adopted the 
legislation as a government matter. The Conservatives sought to distance themselves 
from the Insolvent Act of 1869.89 The Liberals, elected in 1873, did not consider 
bankruptcy law as a government matter. A majority of Members from both sides of the 
                                                 
84 DBT, Annual Meeting 1878 at 191; DBT, Annual Meeting 1878 at 189. 
 
85 DBT, Annual Meeting 1879 at 25-36; 159-177. 
 
86 See Thomas Telfer, “The Canadian Bankruptcy Act of 1919: Public Legislation or Private Interest” 
(1994-95) 24 C.B.L.J. 357. 
 
87 David Brian Robertson, “History, Behaviouralism, and the Return to Institutionalism in American 
Political Science” in E.H. Monkkonen, ed., Engaging the Past: The Uses of History Across the Social 
Sciences (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994) 10 at 113. 
 
88 See e.g., Letter of Dame C. Labelle to Minister of Justice, 15 June 1878; Department of Justice Files, RG 
13-A-2, Vol. 41, File No. 1878-849 (PAC). 
 
89 House of Commons Debates (25 April 1872) at 162 (Cartier). 
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House supported the Insolvent Act of 1875.90 Edward Blake, the Liberal Minister of 
Justice, claimed that since Confederation, governments had never promoted bankruptcy 
law.91 
After returning to power in 1878, the Conservatives appointed the 1879 Select 
Committee, without committing the government to any position.92 Many assumed that 
when the 1879 Reform Bill came to a vote the Conservative government would divide.93 
The Conservative government came under attack in 1879 for refusing “to have policy in 
the matter.”94 As the repeal debates intensified in 1879 and 1880, the Conservatives were 
unwilling to press bankruptcy reform and risk electoral support particularly in the large 
number of rural ridings. MPs’ response to the bankruptcy law crisis no doubt involved a 
“political calculus” that considered the prospects for re-election in the context of a repeal 
or reform vote.95  
 
(ii) Bankruptcy Administrative Machinery 
The Official Assignee had responsibility for the day-to-day administration of the 
bankrupt’s estate and the distribution of dividends to creditors.96 Under the 1869 Act, 
local Boards of Trade or Chambers of Commerce appointed Official Assignees.97 In 
1875, the government assumed control over appointments but it quickly degenerated into 
                                                 
90 House of Commons Debates (26 February 1877) at 306 (Dymond). 
 
91 House of Commons Debates (26 February 1877) at 289. 
 
92 House of Commons Debates (7 March 1879) at 216 (Landry). 
 
93 House of Commons Debates (28 April 1879). 
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a patronage scheme98 with “political affinities” dictating appointments.99 The 
ineffectiveness of Assignees led some to call for greater state intervention in the 
administration of bankruptcy estates100 or making all Assignee appointments subject to a 
competency examination.101 
Creditors often complained of long delays between the commencement of 
proceedings and the actual receipt of a dividend.102 One creditor protested that the estate 
had been in the hands of the Official Assignee for over a year and that all the creditor had 
received was “long letters.” The creditor demanded, “if we do not hear from you soon 
with some money we [will be] taking legal measures to enforce a dividend.”103  Creditors 
also objected to the Assignee’s fees.104 One insolvent, having gone through bankruptcy 
four times in five years, claimed that he would have been wealthier if not for the 
“avariciousness” of the Assignee.105 In Thomas v. Hall106 the court focused on the 
misconduct of the Official Assignee. The judge could not “understand how any 
respectable gentleman filling the office of official assignee” could “assist the defendant in 
the perpetration of this fraud.”107  
Official Assignee misconduct also became a major focus in the press and 
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commercial journals. The Official Assignee was the “pettifogging paid and unlicensed 
lawyer of the insolvent.” It was easy to see that “he will use every means in his power to 
slip his client through, regardless of creditors!”108 Assignees were not fit to hold office as 
they were “merely broken down tradesmen.” This led people to “think the whole 
bankrupt law machinery is a humbug.”109 Critics charged that Assignees took high fees 
yet the Assignee’s work consisted of merely “drawing papers, notices, attendances before 
the judge, drawing final order” etc.110 Assignees prolonged proceedings to “increase the 
expense….Nobody gets paid.” Official assignees “took it all.”111  
As momentum grew in favour of repeal the Canada Law Journal claimed that 
there would be few to “mourn repeal of the Act except an army of official assignees.”112 
There was a sense that under the Insolvent Act of 1875 the Official Assignees had 
benefited most of all.113 A political cartoon published in the Canadian Illustrated News 
represents this best. Entitled “Othello's Occupation Gone!”114 the cartoon shows a 
“disconsolate official assignee” who had heard of the repeal of the Insolvency Law. With 
his hat, gloves and pipe strewn on the floor, and official papers littered everywhere, the 
Assignee with his head in his hand contemplates his next career as a “To Let” sign hangs 
in his window and a “Bankrupt Stock” notice is displayed on the wall.115 One such 
Assignee fearing the prospects of unemployment wrote to Prime Minister Macdonald on 
the eve of repeal seeking another federal patronage appointment, perhaps in Customs. 
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A.W. Roberts claimed that “I will be out in the cold should the Act be repealed.”116 
 
(iii) The Courts 
The judicial interpretation of the Insolvent Acts did not meet the expectations of 
those who had been opposed to bankruptcy law from the outset.117 The Insolvent Acts of 
1869 and 1875 enabled courts to issue second-class discharges.118 A review of reported 
cases reveals only two instances of an appellate court imposing a second-class 
discharge.119 Ontario county court records confirm the infrequency of the second-class 
discharge. A study of these records discloses only a single instance of a single second-
class discharge for the period 1869-1880.120  
Ontario county court files also illustrate that judges did not strictly apply the 
Insolvent Act of 1875. Although the Act only permitted creditors to commence 
proceedings, the legislation became a voluntary regime for many debtors. This has a 
distinct parallel to earlier U.S. Bankruptcy legislation. The U.S. Bankruptcy Act of 1800 
only allowed creditors to begin proceedings. Bruce Mann’s study found both direct and 
indirect evidence of creditor collusion with the debtor to obtain an order of bankruptcy.121 
For indirect evidence, he noted the number of files where a family member filed a 
bankruptcy claim against a relation. Mann notes that it is difficult to determine whether 
related creditors initiated the petition vindictively or compassionately. Both motives are 
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possible but “the ones filed by fathers against sons bear the mark of one generation 
helping fallen members of the next to their feet.”122  
In Canada, the Insolvent Act of 1875 required the plaintiff creditor to complete an 
affidavit stating, “I do not act in this matter in collusion with the defendant not to procure 
him any undue advantage against his creditors.”123 Notwithstanding the no collusion 
affidavit, a study of Ontario county court insolvency procedure books illustrates that it 
was not uncommon for the court to accept a writ of attachment filed by a creditor with 
the same last name as the debtor. Lanark county courts accepted 5.5 per cent of these 
files, Huron 3.5 per cent, Oxford 2.6 per cent and Lambton 0.5 per cent.124 Filings by a 
father against a son are evident.125 For example, William Henry Cooper filed against 
William Henry Cooper the younger on 6 March 1877 and by September of that year, the 
son received his discharge.126 Women also played a role in the initiation of involuntary 
proceedings against a debtor with the same last name.127 While appellate courts were 
prepared to censure collusion between related parties,128 the county courts tolerated some 
level of collusion when it came to the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings.  
The conduct of the county court judges did not escape the scrutiny of the press. 
The Daily Globe complained that courts had adopted the practice of granting every 
petition for a discharge even where there was opposition by creditors. Insolvency law was 
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“surely not intended chiefly to whitewash individuals and apply the sponge to the 
liabilities of defaulting debtors.”129 An 1869 pamphlet claimed that a debtor could get 
through his bankruptcy on easy terms “as any calculating rogue can generally succeed in 
wresting from his reluctant creditors.”130 The press went beyond general attacks on the 
bankruptcy system and directly condemned the bankruptcy judges on a more personal 
basis. The Globe dubbed county court judges as “diminutive aristocrats.”131 An 1869 St. 
John Morning Freeman editorial claimed, “County Court Judges are not always men who 
should be entrusted with the great discretionary powers the bill confers on them.”132 The 
Globe explained the pattern of pro debtor rulings. The “county judge was, perhaps, too 
apt to take the view that the insolvent was a fellow townsman and a decent sort of citizen 
who ought not to be too harshly dealt with.”133 Although there was persistent anti-debtor 
rhetoric, county courts may have been responding to the other side of the debate. Pro 
debtor rhetoric existed and county courts, being courts of first instance, may have been 
reflecting that aspect of public opinion. Theda Skocpol concludes that courts are 
“profoundly rhetorical institutions bound to be affected by moral understandings deeply 
embedded in categories of political discourse.”134 
 
(iv) Federalism 
Despite the clear wording of the federal power under the Constitution Act, a 
number of litigants challenged the validity of the Insolvent Acts. However, the appellate 
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courts, including the Supreme Court of Canada135 and the Privy Council,136 consistently 
upheld the validity of the federal act.137 Despite these rulings, the federal division of 
powers became a source of political debate. In the House of Commons, defenders of 
bankruptcy law pointed to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government over the 
field of bankruptcy and insolvency in the Constitution Act, 1867.138 Others argued that 
bankruptcy law interfered with the “jurisdiction of the Local Legislatures.”139 Federal 
bankruptcy legislation diminished the value of provincial property and civil rights 
jurisdiction.140 The strong belief in provincial rights caused Parliament to consider some 
form of provincial autonomy within the federal bankruptcy scheme. Autonomy might 
involve excluding a specific province altogether from the federal scheme or creating 
some form of preferential treatment for some provinces.141 As proposals for a provincial 
autonomy model under the federal Act failed, many began to think of provincial 
legislation that would help fill the gap if Parliament repealed the legislation. Repeal 
would mean reverting to the common law race of diligent creditors. The division of 
powers would enable provinces to ameliorate the effects of repeal by passing legislation 
providing for their own pro rata distribution scheme under the property and civil rights 
jurisdiction. A provincial solution would mean that a federal bankruptcy law would no 
longer be required. 
In 1879, Oliver Mowat, the premier of Ontario, raised the possibility of provincial 
legislation with Alexander Campbell, the government leader in the Canadian Senate. 
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Mowat understood that “the Insolvent Law is likely to be abolished next session.” Mowat 
suggested a solution that separated the distribution of the debtor’s assets from the 
discharge: 
Is not the release of the debtor at the bottom of all the evils or supposed evils of 
the Act? And is not the machinery of the Act useful and desirable for the 
distribution of the estate equally?142 
 
Mowat told Campbell that he had been considering a bill “which did not recognize 
priority between execution creditors…for Upper Canada” in the event of repeal of the 
federal legislation.143 Mowat suggested that if provincial legislation was not viable then 
the federal government should consider cancelling the discharge provisions of the Act 
and retain the distributive features of the Act. 144 
In 1879, the Senate delayed repeal of the Insolvent Act to “enable the provinces to 
adopt suitable legislation.” Ontario subsequently announced its intention to pass the Act 
to Abolish Priorities Among Execution Creditors.145 Royal Assent was given to the 
Ontario Act on 5 March 1880 which was the day after the Bill to Repeal the Insolvent 
Acts was read for the third time.146 The timing of the Ontario Bill and the federal Repeal 
bill was not a coincidence.147 The new provincial legislation required that creditors share 
rateably in the proceeds realized from the sale of the debtor’s assets but did not provide 
for a discharge.148 Alexander Campbell, speaking in the Senate, confirmed that 
correspondence with the Premier of Ontario had resulted in the preparation of the Ontario 
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Bill that would “meet any evils which might arise from the passage of the [repeal] Bill 
now before the House.”149 
If the federal division of powers made the repeal of bankruptcy law possible 
because of the tempering effects of provincial legislation, did federalism make repeal 
more likely? Members of Parliament were well aware of the proposed Ontario 
legislation.150 The government concluded that it was in the interests of commerce and the 
public “to allow ... the Insolvency Law to be repealed and to let the effect of the repeal 
tempered …by recent legislation in Ontario.”151 Ontario, soon to be followed by other 
provinces, gained a new source of patronage in establishing any required administrative 
structures.152 Federalism contributed to the divorce of equitable distribution of the assets 
from the discharge and made repeal of the federal act possible. 
 
III. Conclusion 
Ideas, interests and institutions had a significant role in leading to the repeal of the 
federal legislation in 1880. The discharge and the distribution of assets provided the focal 
point of much of the public discourse. Beyond identifying the public rhetoric, it is 
important to ask whether any specific interests relied upon aspects of the public discourse 
to advance their cause. The rural farming community relied on public rhetoric on the 
moral obligation to pay in order to repeal legislation that discriminated against them. 
Supporters of a national law, such as the DBT, divided on the repeal question and did not 
have sufficient influence to prevent repeal. Weak governments and the divided political 
parties contributed to repeal. The misconduct of Official Assignees and the debtor 
friendly county courts provided a source of opposition to the law. Finally, federalism 
made repeal in 1880 more likely given that provinces could regulate debtor creditor 
matters under their property and civil rights jurisdiction. 
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Developments after 1880 demonstrate the importance of ideas, interests and 
institutions. Between 1880 and 1903, Parliament debated twenty reform bills that 
proposed to reinstate some form of bankruptcy regime. All failed. By 1903, most 
provinces followed Ontario’s lead in providing for a pro rata distribution scheme and 
some enacted legislation that prohibited preferential payments. The Privy Council’s 
refusal in 1894 to strike down a provision in Ontario preference legislation153 reinforced 
the notion that reform should continue at the provincial level.154 Bankruptcy law did not 
re-surface as a national issue until just before World War I. The growing importance of 
national trade led many to see the flaws in a diverse provincial scheme. The discharge 
came to be recognized as an essential form of business regulation. The Canadian Credit 
Men’s Trust Association (CCMTA), a national interest group, retained a solicitor to draft 
a bankruptcy bill. Whereas the DBT had failed in the nineteenth century, the CCMTA’s 
bill ultimately became a government Bill in 1919 and the Bankruptcy Act of 1919. While 
nineteenth century governments exhibited indifference, the new 1919 Act coincided with 
the emergence of the growing regulatory state after the war.155 
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